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Resumen: Este trabajo estima el grado de conducta colusiva en la 
industria manufacturera mexicana a través de estimar el 
grado de poder de mercado de una empresa representativa 
en una industria. Al igual que en Hall (1988), el supuesto 
de identificación para el poder de mercado plantea que el 
crecimiento de la productividad total de los factores no es 
procíclica. Para medir el grado de conducta colusiva, el 
trabajo estima la elasticidad de la demanda de mercado 
utilizando una restricción de covarianzas entre los choques 
de demanda y de productividad, Shapiro (1987). El grado de 
conducta colusiva se obtiene al calcular el cociente entre la 
elasticidad de la demanda de la empresa representativa y la 
elasticidad de la demanda de mercado. 
Abstract: The paper estimates the degree of collusive conduct in the 
mexican manufacturing industries by estimating the degree 
of market power of a representative firm in an industry. 
Similarly to Hall (1988), the identification assumption for 
the degree of market power is that total factor productivity 
growth is not procyclical. To measure the degree of collu-
sive conduct, the paper estimates the market elasticity of 
demand by exploiting a covariance restriction between de-
mand shocks and productivity shocks, Shapiro (1987). The 
degree of collusive conduct is obtained by calculating the 
ratio between the representative firms elasticity of demand 
and the market elasticity of demand. 
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Introduction 
Current research on the Mexican economy estimates market power by 
calculating concentration indexes.
1 However, concentration indexes have 
poor microeconomic foundations. Moreover, several applied papers have 
shown that concentration indexes may not coincide with econometric results.
2 
This paper applies econometric techniques to measure market conduct. 
We use refutable implications with respect to perfect competition to esti-
mate the markup. This estimate furnishes us with a measurement of the 
degree of elasticity of demand that a representative firm, faces. This paper 
also exploits a covariance restriction between productivity shocks and de- : 
mand shocks, in order to estimate the market elasticity of demand. The ratio 
of the two measurements gives us an estimate of the degree of collusiveness 
in Mexican manufacturing sectors. Bresnahan (1989) argues that this estimate 
is a measure of conduct for models where Cournot behavior is not present. 
The methodology uses Hall's (1988) identification assumption, which 
states that productivity is not intrinsically procyclical. Thus, the finding of a 
procyclical productivity is an implication of market power. To estimate the 
market elasticity of demand, the paper uses Shapiro (1987) proposal. Ac-
cording to him, the residual calculated after estimating the markup, using 
Hall's methodology, should be a good instrument for estimation of the 
market elasticity of demand. The reasoning behind this idea is that produc-
tivity shocks should not be correlated with taste shocks. 
Castañeda (1996a) estimates the markup for 49 manufacturing sectors. 
In this paper we extend the analysis and estimate the market elasticity of 
demand. This estimate, together with the markup estimate, furnishes us 
with a measure of market conduct that may differ from the predictions of 
the markup estimate. 
Methodology 
Let us assume a constant returns to scale technology with no intermediate 
inputs:
3 
1 Casar et al. (1990) La organización industrial en México, is a good example. 
2 See the work by Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). 
3 We do not have data on intermediate inputs. THE DEGREE OF COLLUSIVE CONDUCT  159 
0(r)=A(f) *(?)/(—)  (1) 
A(r) represents Hicks neutral technical progress, K(t) is the stock of 
capital, L(t) represents labor input and 0(t) is output. Differentiating the last 
equation with respect to time and assuming that labor marginal product is 













where a(i) equals the share of labor income in nominal output. 
Under perfect competition, the above equation can be used to measure 
the rate of change of technical progress, ^,(Solow's residual). If perfect 
competition is not present, then we may have a markup over marginal cost, 
unaer tms conation, me measurement ot technical progress given by equa-
tion ^wm not be accurate. 
uenne c ana p as marginal cost ana price, unaer perrect competition 
pn e equa s margina cos, p c. uenne a as labor s snare in output when-
ever output is being calculated at marginal cost, a - —. If perfect compe-
tition is present, a = a*. Under imperfect competition, there is a markup over 
marginal cost, p - £, Solow's residual could be calculated if labors share in 
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Notice that a* = pa. The problem with implementing equation (3) is 
that we do not know the level of the markup. Solow (1957) assumes that 
P= 1. Hall, instead, uses the last equation to estimate the markup, P, by 
assuming that the Solow's residual in level follows a random walk with drift 
and that p was a constant that could be estimated. Thus, Sail assumes that 
j&=A + 0), with A representing the average rate of growth, and 0) a stochastic 
error not correlated with business cycles. Then he estimates p by using an 
instrument that was correlated with die business cycles and tested for the * 
hypothesis P = 1. Hall estimates the following equation by using an instru-
 1 











As Bresnahan (1989) and Shapiro (1987) have suggested, the markup 
is not the right tool metric to measure the degree of collusiveness in an 
industry. A monopoly with an inelastic market demand will have a higher 
markup than a monopoly with an elastic market demand. Thus, the right 
variable to test for collusiveness should include the market elasticity of 
demand. The estimate obtained from Hall's methodology gives us the elas-
ticity of demand faced by a representative firm. Using the plausible as-
sumption that productivity shocks are not correlated with taste shocks, we 
can estimate the market elasticity of demand. The ratio of the market's 
elasticity of demand to the firm's elasticity of demand can be used to 
calculate the degree of collusive behavior in the industry. 
Define e' as the representative firm's elasticity of demand and define e 
as the market elasticity of demand. The ratio, k = — is the conduct parame-
ter that measures the degree of collusiveness in
6an industry. Under full 
monopoly 4=1, under perfect competition it equals zero. 
To overcome the simultaneity problem present when estimating the 
demand equation, this paper uses the residual obtained from equation (4) as THE DEGREE OF COLLUSIVE CONDUCT 161 
an instrument for the demand equation. The paper estimates the following 
homogeneous demand system: 
dO(t) dYjt) dRPjt) 
dt dt dt . ... 
= e + u(t) (5)  0(t) Y(t) RP(t) 
dO(t) dY{t) 
Where —— is the rate of growth of sectoral output, is the rate 
<*> dRm nt) 
of growth of aggregate output, —— is the rate of growth of relative price 
and w(i) is the demand shock.
4 RP® 
Results 
Equations (4) and (5) are estimated for the Mexican manufacturing sector. 
The parameter k is calculated using the results of both equations.
5 Estimates 
are shown for individual industries and for pooled industries. Other method-
ologies that use accounting data can be used to estimate k for individual firms 
(see Bresnahan, 1989). This paper estimates k from industry data. We use 
data from the Cuentas nacionales published by iNEGiand from the Acervos 
de capital published by Banco de México. The data spans the period from 
1970 to 1991. As far as we are aware, this is the first study that estimates the 
parameter k for the Mexican manufacturing sectors. Results for pooled 
industries are shown in table l.
6The pooling procedure is as follows: Equa-
tion (4) is estimated for each sectoral panel of industries, allowing the 
markup to vary across each industry in the panel. The instruments used are 
the contemporary rate of growth of GDPand the lagged value of this variable.
7 
4 We also estimated a nonhomogeneous system by putting the rate of growth of aggregate 
output on the right hand side of the demand equation and estimating its coefficient. The results 
did not vary significantly from those reported in this paper. 
5 From the estimate of p we calculate the representatives firm elasticity of demand e'. 
The standard errors are calculated from first-order Taylor series approximation. 
6 See the appendix for the list of industries pooled under a single sector. 
7 For a justification on the use of these instruments and a discussion of the possible 
measurement errors that could lead to false inferences see Castañeda (1996a). 162 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
The residuals from this estimate are used to estimate the demand 
equation (5).
8 In the panel for equation (5), each industry has a different 
intercept but a common slope. Next, equation (4) is estimated by allowing 
each industry to have a different intercept and a common markup (slope). 
The parameter k for the panel is obtained by using the results from equation 
(4) with a common markup and the results from equation (5) with a com-
mon slope. Except for the markup in food and beverages and in wood, for 
all sectors listed in table 1, standard tests do not reject the hypothesis that 
the slopes of each industry within the panel are equal, thus justifying the ; 
use of the pooling technique. The Durbin-Watson statistics are the average 1 
of the two digit industries included in the panel. -
The first two columns gives us the estimates of equation (4): the first 
column gives us the markup, and the next column gives us the Durbin-Wat-
son statistic calculated as explained above. The number in parentheses are 
the standard errors of the coefficient estimates. Except for paper, all sectors 
show a markup that rejects the hypothesis of price equal to marginal cost. 
The third column gives us the implied representative firm's elasticiy of 
demand. The fourth column gives us the market elasticity of demand and 
the fifth column gives us the resulting measure of monopoly power (k). All 
estimates of market elasticity are negative. In food and beverages, machin-
ery and equipment, chemicals, textiles and metal products, the market elas-
ticity is significantly different from zero. The pooling technique gives us 
precise estimates for most of the sectors shown in the table. 
The measure of monopoly power gives different results with regard to 
market power compared to those given by the markup alone. Thus, for 
example, reject the hypothesis of a markup equal to one in the glass and 
cement sector, but this sector has a market elasticity that is essentially zero. 
Thus, the hypothesis of a full monopoly (* = 1) can be rejected, while the 
hypothesis of perfect competition can not be. With textiles we also have 
differ ingresultswithrespecttotheinformationprovidedbythemarkupand 
thatprovidedbytheconductparameter.Withrespecttothemarkup,thereis 
market power in textiles. In contrast, when we look at thepar ameter k, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of perfect competition and we can reject the 
hypothesis of full monopoly. In other sectors, the inference from themarkup 
coincideswiththeinferenceobtainedfromtheconductparameter.Thisis 
8 This procedure, ensures that the instrument is orthogonal to the taste shock in the 
sample. THE DEGREE OF COLLUSIVE CONDUCT  163 
Table 1 
Pooled Industries  
Sector Markup DW e' e DW k 
Food and beverages 2.6* 1.99 -1.61" -0.536* 1.99 0.333°
+ 
(0.44) (0.16) (0.144) (0.09) 
Wood 3.4* 1.72 -1.42" 1.038 2.01 0.073 
(0.67) (0.121) (2.31) (1.62) 
Machinery and equipment 2.9* 1.82 -1.53" -1.12" 1.73 0.734° 
(0.342) (0.095) (0.387) (0.258) 
Basic metals 4.5* 1.94 -1.28" -1.31 1.54 1.02 
(1.06) (0.085) (1.3) (1.01) 
Glass and cement 3.1* 1.39 -1.48" -0.073 1.86 0.049
+ 
(0.536) (0.123) (0.58) (0.392) 
Chemicals 1.6* 2.11 -2.6" -0.447* 1.97 0.172°
+ 
(0.367) (0.939) (0.194) (0.097) 
Paper 1.9 1.82 -2.04" -3.18 1.70 1.55 
(0.597) (0.648) (4.69) (2.35) 
Textiles 2.6* 2.65 -1.63" -0.771* 1.93 0.474
+ 
(0.672) (0.264) (0.447) (0.286) 
Metal products 2.5* 1.84 -1.69" -1.16* 1.77 0.686° 
(0.68) (0.321) (0.312) (0.226) 
Transport equipment 2.4* 2.05 -1.71" -1.24 1.64 0.72 
(0.51) (0.262) (3.25) (1.9) 
* Rejects the hypothesis that the markup is equal to one at the five percent level. 
- Rejects the hypothesis that the firms elasticity is equal to zero at the five percent. 
A Rejects the hypothesis that the market elasticity is equal to zero at the five percent. 
° Rejects the hypothesis of perfect competition (k = 0) at the five percent. 
+ Rejects the hypothesis of monopoly (Jfc = 1) at the five percent. 
the case for food and beverages, machinery and equipment, chemicals and 
metal products. We could argue that there is oligopolistic behavior in these 
industries. In wood, basic metals, paper and transport equipment, the esti-
mates of conduct are too imprecise to yield an inference. 
Note that food and beverages, machinery and equipment, textile and 
metal products have similar markups. However, the conduct parameter 
yields different inferences. In textiles we cannot reject the hypothesis of 
perfect competition, whereas in the others we can. In machinery and equipment 
and metal products we cannot reject the hypothesis of full collusion, 
whereas in food and beverages and textiles we can. Thus, sectors with 
similar markups yield different inferences with regard to market conduct. 164 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Similarly, chemicals has a lower markup than textiles. However, for chemi-
cals, the market conduct parameter does reject the hypothesis of perfect 
competition. Thus, we need more information than that offered by markup, 
if we want to have useful information on market conduct. 
Previous work, using single (unpooled) two digit estimates of the 
markup, has shown that there is ample evidence of market power in the 
Mexican manufacturing sector.
9 The panel results on the markup in this 
work, reject the perfect competition hypothesis in 44 industries (this num-
ber is equal to the two digit industries included in the following sectors: 
food and beverages, wood, machinery and equipment, basic metals, glass
 1 
and cement, chemicals, textiles, metal products and transport equipment). 
The panel results on the parameter k suggest that 26 industries show evi-
dence of non-competitive conduct. These industries are found in the follow-
ing four sectors: food and beverages, machinery and equipment, chemicals, 
and metal products. 
We also have estimates for durable and nondurable goods and for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole.
1
0
 The method of estimation is the same as 
the one used for table 1. The results are shown in table 2. We can see in 
table 2 that the use of the pooling technique allows us to have very precise 
estimates of the markup, the market elasticity of demand and the conduct 
parameter. For durables we cannot reject the hypothesis of a common 
markup and a common elasticity across industries. For nondurables and 
manufacturing, we reject the hypothesis of a common markup across indus-
tries and we cannot reject the hypothesis of a common elasticity. 
As the last table shows, both the markup and the conduct parameter 
show that oligopolistic behavior is present at the aggregate level in the 




Despite the fact that the durables sector has a similar markup to non-
durables, the market conduct parameter cannot reject the hypothesis of full 
monopoly for the durables industry. This indicates that the markup is not a 
good predictor of market conduct. 
9 Previous work, using evidence of the markup and making single two digit estimates, 
showed evidence of noncompetitive conduct in 30 industries (see Castañeda, 1996b). 
1
0
 See the appendix for a list of the industries included under durable and non-durable goods. 
1
1
 However, the last inference must be taken with care, taking into consideration the fact 
that economic theory suggests that the pricing rule for durable goods entails intertemporal 
aspects not considered in the equations estimated. THE DEGREE OF COLLUSIVE CONDUCT 165 
We also calculated estimates for k and the markup at the two digit level. 
The methodology for this estimate was simple. First we estimate equation 
(4) for each two digit industry. The instruments used are the same as those 
used above. The residuals from this estimate are used to estimate the de-
mand equation (5). The parameter it is calculated by using the results from 
equations (4) and (5). The results are reported in table 3. The columns are in the 
same order and represent the same items reported in tables 1 and 2. 
Table 2 
Aggregate Pooled Industries 
Sector  Markup  DW  e'  e  DW  k 
Nondurables  2.46*  2.02  -1.68"  -0.25
























(0.20)  (0.083)  (0.1)  (0.05) 
* Rejects the hypothesis that the markup is equal to one at the five percent level. 
* Rejects the hypothesis that the firms elasticity is equal to zero at the five percent. 
A Rejects the hypothesis that the market elasticity is equal to zero at the five percent. 
° Rejects the hypothesis of perfect competition (* = 0)atthe five percent. 
+ Rejects the hypothesis of monopoly (k = l)atthe five percent. 
We only show the results for which the market conduct parameter 
yields definitive inferences. The results show again that the two alternative 
measures of market power (the markup and the market conduct parameter) 
do not always yield the same results. Except for meat and dairy, the market 
elasticity of demand is negative for all two-digit industries listed in table 3. 
For industries 11, 16, 38, and 49 (meat and dairy, sugar, pharmaceutical 
products and fabricated metals), we do not reject the hypothesis of perfect 
competition according to the markup standard. The collusion parameter 
does not reject the hypothesis of perfect competition either, but rejects the 
hypothesis of full collusion (Jfc = l).For industries 13,14, and 50(wheat 
grinding,corngrindingandothermetalproducts),themarkupstandard 
rejectsthehypothesisofperfect competition, however, thecollusion stand-
ard does not reject the hypothesis of perfect competition but does reject the 
hypothesis of full collusion. For industries 21 and 52 (beer and non-electrical 
machinery), the markup and the collusion parameters reject the hypothesis 166 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
of perfect competition. For industry 21 we are able to reject the hypothesis 
of full collusion too, thus showing the existence of oligopolistic competition. 
For industry 52 we are not able to reject the hypothesis of full collusion. For 
industries not shown in table 3, the standard deviation of the estimates for 
the markup or the market elasticity of demand or both, became too large and 
did not allow us to reject any of the hypotheses. For this reason we do not 
report the results for those industries in table 3. 
Markup DW e' e DW k  Sector  
11 Meat and dairy 
13 Wheat grinding 
14 Corn grinding 
16 Sugar 
21 Beer 
38 Pharmaceutical products 
49 Fabricated metals 
50 Other metal products 
52 Electrical machinery 
Table 3 
Two Digit Industries 
1.85 1.62 -2.18 
(1.52) (2.11) 
2.12* 1.92 -1.89" 
(0.31) (0.24) 
8.15* 1.4 -1.14" 
(1.96) (0.04) 
5.6 1.23 -1.22" 
(3.92) (0.19) 
3.6* 1.62 -1.38" 
(0.53) (0.077) 
2.3 2.7 -1.8" 
(1.4) (0.79) 
2.3 1.5 -1.8" 
(1.5) (0.89) 
3.6* 1.4 -1.4" 
(0.62) (0.09) 
2.8* 1.8 -1.5" 
(0.48) (0.14) 
0.94  1.83  -0.43
+ 
(0.96)  (0.61) 
-0.32  1.57  0.17
+ 
(0.31)  (0.16) 
-0.48  1.4  0.42+ 
(0.38)  (0.33) 
-0.17  1.86  0.14
+ 
(0.39)  (0.32) 
0.45°
+  -0.62




(0.19)  (0.13) 





(0.17)  (0.29) 
-0.73
A  2.1  0.41
+ 
(0.41)  (0.31) 
-0.36  1.4  0.26
+ 
(0.34)  (0.24) 
-1.4  1.9  0.93° 
(0.60)  (0.4) 
* Rejects the hypothesis that the markup is equal to one at the five percent level. 
" Rejects the hypothesis that the firms elasticity is equal to zero at the five percent level. 
" Rejects the hypothesis that the market elasticity is equal to zero at the five percent level. 
° Rejects the hypothesis of perfect competition (* = 0) at the five percent level. 
+ Rejects the hypothesis of monopoly (/t = 1) at the five percent level. 
Note that industries with similar markups yield differing predictions 
with regard to market conduct. For example, industries 21 and 50 (beer and 
other metal products) have the same measurement of markup (3.6). How-
ever, the market conduct predicts oligopolistic interaction for beer and can THE DEGREE OF COLLUSIVE CONDUCT  167 
not reject the perfectly competitive outcome for other metal products. The 
same inconsistency can be found in industries 13 and 52 (wheat grinding 
and electrical machinery). Despite the fact that their markup does not differ 
very much, the market conduct parameter yields differing inferences. We 
were unable to reject the hypothesis of perfect competition for wheat grind-
ing. In contrast, we were able to reject the hypothesis of perfect competition 
for electrical machinery. 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper we estimate market conduct as defined in Bresnahan (1989). 
The estimation procedure combines Halls identification assumption, which 
states that the Solow residual should not be correlated with aggregate 
fluctuations, with the assumption that productivity shocks should not be 
correlated with taste shocks. Using this procedure, this paper estimates the 
market elasticity of demand for several industries and sectors. With the 
information provided by Halls markup equation and the market demand 
equation, this paper calculates their conduct parameters. 
The results show that the inferences obtained by estimating only the 
markup equation are not always confirmed when we use the information 
provided by the conduct parameter. Thus, in searching for empirical evi-
dence of market power, the researcher should have be sceptical whenever 
the information on market power is based only on the degree of markup. 
More information on the market elasticity of demand is needed, to obtain a 
more precise inference on market power. Industries with similar markups 
yield differing inferences with regard to market conduct when we use 
information on the market elasticity of demand. 
Other studies which estimate the markup of different industries in the 
Mexican manufacturing sector have concluded that there is ample evidence 
of market power (Castañeda (1996a). This study takes the agenda for re-
search one step further by estimating the market conduct parameter. The 
panel results of this paper show that the parameter k indicates that the 
hypothesis of competitive conduct can be rejected in 26 industries. 168 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
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Appendix 
• The food and beverages sector includes industries 11 to 22 in the Sistema 
de cuentas nacionales (meat and dairy, fruit and vegetables, wheat 
grinding, corn grinding, coffee, sugar, oil and fat, animal food, other food 
products, alcoholic beverages, beer and beverages). 
• The wood sector includes industries 29 and 30 (wood and wood prod-
ucts). 
• The machinery and equipment sector includes industries 51,52 54 and 55 
(non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, electronic instruments 
and electric instruments). 
• The basic metals sector includes industries 46 and 47 (primary iron metals 
and primary non-iron metals). 
• The glass and cement sector includes industries 43 and 44 (glass and glass 
products and cement). THE DEGREE OF COLLUSIVE CONDUCT  169 
• The chemical sector includes industries 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 
(basic chemicals, synthetic resins, pharmaceutical products, soaps and 
detergents, other chemical products, rubber products and plastic products). 
• The paper sector includes industries 31 and 32 (paper products and 
printing/publishing). 
• The textiles sector includes industries 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 (soft fiber 
textiles, resilient fiber textiles, other textile products and apparel). 
• The metal products sector includes industries 48, 49 and 50 (metal 
furniture, fabricated metals and other metal products). 
• The transport equipment sector includes industries 56, 57 and 58 (auto-
mobiles, autoparts and transport equipment). 
• The durable goods sector includes industries 29,30,43,44,45,46,47,48 
49 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59. 
• The nondurable goods sector includes industries 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 39,41, 42. 
Manufacturing includes all two digit manufacturing industries except 
for 33, 34 and 36. For these industries we could not get accurate data. 
Data 
Output was obtained from the statistics for sectoral GDP published by the 
INEGI in the Sistema de cuentas nacionales. We used data at constant and 
nominal prices. These data were adjusted for indirect taxation and subsidies. 
The sectoral price deflator (p) was obtained by combining the real and 
nominal data. The sources for labor data were the statistics on employment 
published by the INEGI. From the sectoral employment data we calculated 
yearly hours worked by assuming that each worker would work 40 hours per 
week with two weeks of vacation per year. Although this methodology seems 
arbitrary, it appears to be the only available methodology. Labor income was 
obtained from the Sistema de cuentas nacionales published by the INEGI. 
The average wage (w) is calculated from the ratio of labor income to yearly 
hours. The data on capital assets were taken from the publications by the 
Banco de México. In its estimates, the Central Bank uses the methodology 
of perpetual inventories, which appears to be a reasonable way of estimating 
the capital assets. The relative price is calculated as the ratio of the industry 
deflator to the aggregate GDP deflator. 